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Tackling Nuclear Terrorism in 
South Asia
BY FEROZ HASSAN KHAN AND EMILY BURKE
Feroz Hassan Khan is a Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA and a former 
Brigadier General in the Pakistan Army. 
Emily Burke is a Research Assistant at the Naval Postgraduate School and is a graduate student in 
the Combating Terrorism: Policy and Strategy curriculum. 
Since India and Pakistan conducted their nuclear tests in 1998, every danger associated with nuclear weapons – proliferation, instability, and terrorism – has been linked to the region. And despite nuclear deterrence and the modernization of nuclear forces, South Asia is a far 
cry from achieving stability. Indeed, the security situation in South Asia has deteriorated and 
violent extremism has surged to unprecedentedly high levels. In the past decades, both states have 
operationalized their nuclear deterrent forces, increased production of fissile material and nuclear 
delivery means, and developed plans to field a nuclear capable triad. Concurrently, both countries 
are expanding civilian nuclear facilities in their quests for a cleaner source of energy to combat 
current and future energy shortages. As tensions and violence in the region have increased, both 
states blame the other’s policy choices for the scourge of terrorism that has seized the region. New 
leadership in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan however, creates an opening to tackle the immedi-
ate scourge of violent extremist organizations and unresolved historic conflicts. Ironically the 
traditional stabilizing force in the region – the United States – is drawing down in Afghanistan 
and shifting its focus to the Asia-Pacific region and to Russia where new tensions have erupted. 
Within this security context, India and Pakistan will be left on their own to devise mechanisms 
to mitigate and eliminate the regional risk of terrorism.
As the South Asian threat matrix becomes more complex and with concomitant progress in 
the nuclear field, these developments provide the basis for the spectacular terror attacks in New 
Delhi, Mumbai, Karachi, and Islamabad-Rawalpindi. As states possessing nuclear weapons, both 
India and Pakistan must find a common objective and mechanisms to deal with the metastasizing 
menace of terrorism. It is imperative that both states acquire the highest standard of nuclear 
security best practices and learn to live as peaceful nuclear neighbors. Individually, as well as col-
laboratively, India and Pakistan should direct their efforts to creating a cooperative relationship 
in the region and developing a nuclear security regime that encapsulates the nuclear security 
visions set by the three global nuclear security summits.1 
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In order to analyze the dangers of nuclear 
terrorism, this article will examine four vari-
ables: threat, probability, consequence, and 
risk. The threat of nuclear terrorism undeni-
ably exists, but the risk of nuclear terrorism is 
determined by factoring both probability and 
consequence. To enable state policy and 
regional discourse to address nuclear terrorism 
with the maximum effectiveness, an assess-
ment of the risk – not just the threat – is neces-
sary. This article will first outline the evolution 
of the threat of nuclear terrorism both globally 
and regionally. Next, we will describe South 
Asian threat perceptions and the impacts on 
nuclear safety and security. Then, the article 
will evaluate the threats based on probability 
and consequence, and finally identify the high-
est risk threat. Focusing on this threat, we will 
assess the current tools available and offer 
policy recommendations and ideas for 
regional cooperation between India and 
Pakistan to combat this threat. 
EVOLUTION OF THE THREAT
While fears of nuclear weapons date back to 
the genesis of the weapons themselves, nuclear 
terrorism has largely gained attention as a sub-
stantial threat to national and international 
security since the mass casualties and destruc-
tion of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
against the United States. Nuclear prolifera-
tion, security, and safety have historically been 
concerns, but only recently has terrorism 
added a new dimension and elevated nuclear 
terrorism to the top tier of U.S. national secu-
rity concerns. For the purposes of this article, 
nuclear terrorism is designated as the use or 
threat of use of nuclear material in order to 
achieve a political goal.2
The threat from nuclear terrorism has for 
the most part mirrored historical trends. The 
development of nuclear weapons and then the 
destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki cre-
ated an existential fear of nuclear weapon use 
by state actors throughout the Cold War. The 
post-Cold War era saw a rise in the regulation 
of nuclear materials, followed by post-2001 
strengthening of nuclear sites in hopes of pre-
venting the “loose nukes” syndrome many had 
predicted.3 In its place, proliferation to weak 
states and the stability of nuclear states became 
the greatest concerns in nuclear policy. 
In the 21st century terrorism has been 
linked to all U.S. national security-related pol-
icies, including nuclear security policy. The 
Obama Administration’s 2011 National Strategy 
for Counterterrorism states, “the danger of 
nuclear terrorism is the greatest threat to 
global security.” Preventing terrorists from 
acquiring WMDs and nuclear materials is 
ranked as one of the top overarching counter-
terrorism goals.4 Furthermore, the United 
States tied nuclear security to terrorism by 
stewarding biannual Nuclear Security Summits 
where member states pledge and work towards 
safeguarding nuclear materials in order to pre-
vent their transfer to terrorists.
Meanwhile another significant develop-
ment is the proliferation of nuclear facilities 
due to the rise of nuclear energy and the 
expanding ring of legitimacy for nuclear trade. 
Nuclear energy was seen as a “solution” to the 
environmental concerns associated with non 
renewable resources, but fear of terrorism has 
soured this view. After the Fukushima Daiichi 
disaster, nuclear energy facilities are seen in a 
new light as vulnerable to security threats ema-
nating from both natural disasters and man-
made attacks.5 This fact brings South Asia into 
focus in a curious way. 
India is the beneficiary of a civilian 
nuclear agreement with the United States 
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A radiation hotspot after the Fukushima nuclear plant began releasing substantial amounts of 
radioactive materials in March 2011.
permitting it to retain and develop nuclear 
weapon capabilities and expand civilian 
nuclear facilities, with international coopera-
tion in nuclear trade. This sets a precedent for 
the expansion of civilian nuclear facilities, as 
well as vertical proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons in the region. Pakistan has responded to 
the perceived legitimacy conferred upon 
India’s nuclear weapons program by this agree-
ment by offsetting conventional military force 
weakness with nuclear deterrence, and plans 
to increase its civilian nuclear power plants to 
meet its energy shortages. As a result, nuclear 
facilities in South Asia are multiplying at the 
very moment the threat of nuclear terrorism is 
also growing. 
Nuclear Terrorism in South Asia
The waves of terrorism currently afflicting 
South Asia flow from a long, complex history. 
Since their independence, both India and 
Pakistan have used proxies to affect each oth-
er’s internal dynamics. This has led to wars, 
crises, and even secessionism with the creation 
of Bangladesh in 1971. Before 2001, India and 
Pakistan were the focus of attention due to 
proliferation concerns and the implications of 
being self-declared nuclear powers after the 
1998 tests. After 2001, South Asia became the 
epicenter for the war against al-Qaeda. The 
problem of terrorism has become so complex 
that a spectacular terrorist attack could happen 
in any part of the region. South Asia has 
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already seen such dramatic terrorist attacks as 
the 2001 attack on India’s Parliament, the 
2008 Mumbai attacks, the 2008 Marriott 
bombing in Islamabad, as well as various 
attacks on Pakistani government and military 
facilities. The region has come under even 
greater scrutiny for nuclear terrorism since the 
revelation that Osama bin Laden met two 
retired Pakistani scientists and showed interest 
in acquiring nuclear technology.6 In addition, 
both Indian and Pakistani nuclear arsenals 
have grown at a steady pace. Thus, the fears of 
WMD terrorism have added to the previous 
concerns of proliferation and stability, and 
generated heightened allegations and scrutiny. 
The permissive regional environment for ter-
rorism is not easily reversed – it requires con-
certed, time-consuming, and costly efforts. 
Given the nature of these attacks and the grow-
ing nuclear arsenals and civilian nuclear facil-
ities, nuclear terrorism is at the crosshairs of 
multiple regional trends.
In South Asia overall threat perception has 
mirrored trends in nuclear politics. The popu-
lar perception of nuclear terrorism combines 
nuclear safety, nuclear security, and terrorism 
into one issue. As any one of these issues 
becomes inflamed, the general fear of nuclear 
terrorism rises. In reality these three issues are 
distinct concerns with unique causes, solu-
tions, and policy implications. First, nuclear 
safety management relates to the technical 
steps needed to prevent nuclear accidents and 
ensure optimal and safe operations. Second, 
nuclear security pertains to prevention of 
unauthorized access, tampering, accounting, 
and protection, as well as numerous preventive 
and reactive steps that require both technical 
and military security instruments and prac-
tices. Third, terrorism pertains to the presence 
and activities of violent extremist organiza-
tions operating with impunity across state bor-
ders; this of course is a central concern and its 
reduction and elimination require different 
tools and measures. Regardless of its nuclear 
status, a state is responsible for eliminating ter-
rorism within its borders. The failure to miti-
gate or eliminate terrorism does not absolve a 
state from its safety and security responsibili-
ties; rather all nuclear capable states must be 
committed to the highest standard of nuclear 
safety and security regardless of the internal or 
external threats. Without addressing the factors 
that allow terrorism to exist, nuclear terrorism 
will always remain a concern.
Another challenge for nuclear terrorism is 
that it is plagued by an imprecise lexicon. 
Placing “nuclear” as a prefix to terrorism 
dilutes the complexity and makes it difficult to 
differentiate between a hyped threat and a real-
istic threat. This is compounded by the pro-
pensity to use nuclear terrorism and nuclear 
security interchangeably. The rhetorical ten-
sions result in increased hype concerning the 
nuclear terrorism threat and are often used by 
countries as a propaganda tool to defame 
states with which they have adversarial rela-
tionships. At the same time, nuclear security 
measures such as ratification of international 
treaties, legislation, and regimes allows 
nuclear-armed states to gain diplomatic mile-
age without identifying the realistic threat and 
constructing an adequate response. In order to 
fully understand the threat of nuclear 
Placing “nuclear” as a prefix to terrorism 
dilutes the complexity and makes it difficult 
to differentiate between a hyped threat and a 
realistic threat.
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Today, Pakistan perceives threats to its 
nuclear facilities from a host of both external 
and internal threats. 
terrorism in South Asia it is necessary to 
understand the complexity of the threat 
matrix: the external threat, the internal threat, 
and the extent of international scrutiny. 
ASSESSMENT OF THREAT PERCEPTIONS
The presentation of a balanced assessment of 
both India’s and Pakistan’s threat perceptions 
must address a central question: Why have 
India and Pakistan developed different param-
eters for nuclear security? We assess that this is 
primarily due to their differing threat percep-
tions and distinctive international involve-
ment and approaches to each state.
Pakistani Threat Perceptions
From the outset, Pakistan confronted obstacles 
and opposition to its nuclear weapons ambi-
tions that affected the nuclear security regime 
of the country. Over time three threat percep-
tions emerged that shaped Islamabad’s nuclear 
security management. First, beginning in the 
late 1970s, several incidents forced Islamabad 
to focus on the external threat of a sudden dis-
arming attack that could prevent the nascent 
buildup of its capabilities.7 Second, like all 
nuclear weapon states, an “insider threat” was 
feared – a mole or spy from an external hostile 
intelligence agency determined to compromise 
nuclear secrets or sabotage the program from 
within. Pakistan had a special reason to focus 
on this threat because its official policy denied 
the existence of a military nuclear program due 
to repressive nuclear sanctions and attempts by 
Western intelligence agencies to spy on 
Pakistani centrifuge facilities.8 The third per-
ception developed after 2001, when violent 
radical threats within the state became ram-
pant in Pakistani society in general while spe-
cific incidents occurred that targeted Pakistani 
security forces.9
Today, Pakistan perceives threats to its 
nuclear facilities from a host of both external 
and internal threats. Recent events that exacer-
bate these fears include the fatal attack on 
Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad; reports of 
CIA covert operations disguised as vaccination 
campaigns to collect DNA in the search for bin 
Laden; CIA contractor Raymond Davis’s killing 
of civilians in Lahore; relentless drone strikes; 
and border incidents on the Salala post of the 
Afghan-Pakistan border. The regional security 
situation deteriorated further after the Mumbai 
terror attack and continuing terrorist opera-
tions in Afghanistan – especially those led by 
Afghan Taliban. While external threat percep-
tions deepened, the Pakistani internal situa-
tion has also deteriorated exponentially. The 
2007 operation in Lal Masjid and the estab-
lishment of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) 
and other violent extremist groups and sectar-
ian religious groups have challenged the writ 
of the state. For over a decade, Pakistan has 
faced a separatist violent movement in 
Baluchistan. The combination of tribal border 
region tensions and al-Qaeda attacks has 
embroiled Pakistan’s military in multiple 
counterinsurgency contingencies.10 Given these 
multiple complex threats, the Pakistani nuclear 
security regime has evolved much differently 
in the past decade than was the case in the 
earlier decades of its nuclear program. 
Indian Threat Perceptions
In contrast, India’s nuclear security discourse 
has developed an entirely different narrative. 
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While Pakistan braces for both internal and 
external threats, India is relatively spared from 
either. China remains India’s primary external 
threat and India’s worst case threat perceptions 
are rooted in the persistent belief in Sino-
Pakistani collusion on everything from eco-
nomic deals to intelligence matters. However, 
this belief does not play a significant role in 
Indian nuclear security perceptions. India does 
fear an external attack emanating from China 
by aircraft or missile, though it has never been 
subject to a deep aerial attack directly from 
China. Thus, fear of a preventive strike linked 
to China or another external power does not 
compute in India’s threat calculus. Although 
India’s relationship with China is antagonistic 
and its threat perceptions are based on long- 
term perceptions, India’s immediate security 
focus is on Pakistan. With a bitter history of 
wars and crises, the most significant perceived 
threat is a terror attack master-minded by a 
Pakistan-based extremist organization that 
India believes is state-sponsored. In any case, 
even as India’s adversarial relationships with 
China and Pakistan are likely to continue with 
ups and downs, the prospect of an external 
power attacking India’s nuclear facility is per-
ceived as unlikely. Further India’s internal 
security situation is qualitatively different than 
Pakistan’s, and as such India’s nuclear security 
culture has evolved differently. 
The composition of India’s internal threat 
is vastly different from the domestic threats 
within Pakistan. India is home to a host of 
secessionist, fifth column, saboteur, and radi-
cal extremist groups. These groups range from 
socio-revolutionary groups like the Naxalites 
in the “red corridor” in Eastern India, to seces-
sionist movements and centrifugal forces from 
Kashmir in the north to Tamil Nadu in the 
An Indian Agni-II intermediate range ballistic missile on a road-mobile launcher displayed at the 




TACKLING NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA
PRISM 5, no. 1 FEATURES  | 87
south. These movements and the associated 
tensions have existed with sporadic intensities 
throughout almost the entire history of inde-
pendent India. Further, terrorist groups such as 
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Lashkar-e-Taiba 
(LeT) are supporting operations in the 
Kashmiri struggle and elsewhere in India. 
India is also experiencing a rise of Hindu 
extremist groups which always have the poten-
tial to ignite a communal conflict; sparks have 
ignited in Mumbai, Gujarat, and the “train ter-
ror” (Samjhota Express). These groups have 
been proven to operate within India and wage 
high-consequence terror attacks including 
major ones such as the 2001 Indian Parliament 
and the 2008 Mumbai attacks. 
While these groups within India are 
numerous, they are of a different level of mag-
nitude than their counterparts in Pakistan, 
which is threatened internally by terrorist orga-
nizations both within Pakistan itself as well as 
across the porous border in Afghanistan. It is 
unknown whether a radical insider from any 
of these movements could possibly penetrate 
India’s nuclear facilities, though such a possi-
bility cannot be ruled out. From India’s view-
point its internal threats are primarily those 
sponsored by external agencies. The 2008 
Mumbai terror attack re-confirmed the belief 
that the internal terror threat is due to terror-
ists infiltrating from neighboring states or 
externally sponsored sleeper cells. However, 
India does not fear the same challenge from 
rampant instability that is evident in Pakistan. 
India’s nuclear security culture has a greater 
emphasis on an outside sponsored terror 
attack on its facilities rather than an insider 
instigating a nuclear security breach.
Quite apart from differing threat percep-
tions,  another factor that has affected 
Pakistan’s and India’s respective approaches to 
nuclear security is the nature of the interna-
tional approach towards terror in the region 
during the past decade.
Implications of the International Approach
The international community has dramatically 
influenced nuclear threat perceptions in 
Pakistan. In the context of the American-led 
Global War on Terror, the flourishing terror 
infrastructure has adversely affected U.S.-
Pakistan relations. Internal threats have raised 
American and international concerns over the 
legacy and possible survival of the A.Q. Khan 
proliferation network, and the level of central 
control over government facilities. In reaction 
to Pakistani military operations in tribal areas, 
terrorist organizations have proven their abil-
ity to retaliate in kind against both military 
bases and soft civilian targets. Specifically, ter-
ror attacks against military headquarters and 
bases have undermined the authority of the 
military and intelligence institutions and wid-
ened the opening for international scrutiny 
and conjecture about nuclear terrorism in 
Pakistan. 
Although Pakistan operates under con-
tinuous intense international scrutiny, it has 
made substantial gains in bolstering its nuclear 
architecture, safety, and security. Pakistan has 
developed a Center of Excellence and offered 
to provide counterpart training in nuclear 
security practices. Pakistan has also selectively 
opened its Center and its training facilities to 
respond to nuclear security incidents. Recently 
Pakistan allowed the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) Secretary General to 
visit the Center of Excellence, who was report-
edly very impressed.11 These accomplishments 
have been recognized and acknowledged by 
the international community as shown in the 
recently released 2014 Nuclear Threat Index 
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(NTI).12 Still, the heightened levels of scrutiny 
undermine Pakistan’s ability to overcome its 
nuclear legacy and reduce international fears 
of nuclear terrorism in Pakistan.
The international community has had a 
profoundly different role in the formulation of 
India’s nuclear security infrastructure. The 
most significant factor shaping the interna-
tional community’s approach towards Indian 
nuclear safety and security today is the U.S.-
India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which governs 
civilian nuclear trade between the United 
States and India. The international community 
has interpreted this agreement as an indicator 
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of legitimacy and tacit approval of India’s 
nuclear program, as well as symbolic verifica-
tion of India’s superior nuclear safety and 
security. Therefore, India faces considerably 
less international scrutiny than Pakistan.
As noted above, India is not entirely 
immune from nuclear safety and security con-
cerns; it is only afforded a relative degree of 
confidence compared to Pakistan. Even though 
India has demonstrated a past track record of 
effective nuclear management, this must be 
understood in the context of the limited tools 
to measure of effectiveness.13 There is general 
international agreement with India’s percep-
tion that any threat to its nuclear security is 
likely to originate from an external source and 
any such threat will be sufficiently addressed 
before escalating to a nuclear incident. It is 
likely that India has taken significant steps to 
ensure nuclear security in an environment of 
internal and external threats. However, com-
pared to Pakistan, India’s measures and 
response are less widely known as it does not 
advertise its nuclear security best practices. 
This is not likely to change due to the afore-
mentioned international approach that has 
created an environment where India has little 
incentive to further improve nuclear safety and 
security.14 Despite these positive perceptions 
and modest improvements, India ranked lower 
than Pakistan in the 2014 NTI Index.15 
As a result of both India’s and Pakistan’s 
perceived external threats and their long-stand-
ing strategic rivalry, South Asia does not have 
a culture of openness on nuclear security. 
Spotless performance in the absence of mean-
ingful measures of effectiveness does not nec-
essarily equate to nuclear security.16 Rather, 
India and Pakistan choose to veil site security 
in secrecy and boast about achievements. If 
terrorist attacks have been thwarted at these 
facilities, they are not publicized for a host of 
reasons: (1) a sensitive site could be compro-
mised; (2) intelligence methods on site protec-
tion could be publically revealed; (3) admit-
ting vulnerability reinforces propaganda about 
site insecurity. Without a public record of mea-
sured effectiveness or information on how cur-
rent site security measures have been per-
formed, nuclear site security remains a serious 
concern and must be acknowledged as a factor 
leading potentially to a breakout of nuclear 
terrorism.
A balanced and objective assessment 
should conclude that the threats facing India 
and Pakistan respectively are qualitatively dif-
ferent. Pakistan faces a greater internal threat 
than India and also endures significantly 
greater international scrutiny on nuclear safety 
and security. Therefore it is not surprising that 
Pakistani measures to deal with safety and 
security are correspondingly greater. India is 
not subject to the same level of international 
scrutiny, and experiences less pressure to pub-
licize its nuclear security arrangements and 
advertise its best practices. From a performance 
perspective, as recognized in public acknowl-
edgements worldwide concerning both nuclear 
armed South Asian states, there is a degree of 
confidence. However, there is little to no pub-
lic source to analyze measures of effectiveness. 
EVALUATING THE RISK
Calculating the risk of nuclear terrorism in 
South Asia must take into account an under-
standing of both Pakistani and Indian threat 
perceptions, as well as their respective internal 
nuclear politics. The phrase, “nuclear terror-
ism,” creates the specter of nuclear catastrophe 
with severe consequences. The fear of these 
consequences and the dissemination of histri-
onic literature on the possibilities cause 
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policymakers, academics, and the public to 
lose sight of the probability and focus only on 
the devastating outcomes. 
Policy proposals should be based on a 
realistic assessment of the threat in order to 
maximize effectiveness and cost-savings. To 
calculate the risk of nuclear terrorism, this 
article uses the formulation of risk equals 
probability times consequence. The majority 
of the current assessment and preventive steps 
for nuclear terrorism base risk solely on the 
severity of the consequence instead of factor-
ing in probability. If the probability is zero or 
near zero, the consequence is irrelevant 
because the risk is the same as that of the level 
of probability. To avoid complacency, a sober 
assessment of probable scenarios is necessary 
to evaluate the risks and to encourage con-
structive thinking towards realistic solutions.
Therefore, the increase in terrorism in 
South Asia in the last decade does not neces-
sarily correlate to an increase in the likelihood 
of nuclear terrorism. The expansion and 
strengthening of international nuclear safe-
guards along with an increased commitment 
and buy-in from the state to tackle terrorism 
are the pathways towards reducing the condi-
tions for terrorism. In our assessment, many of 
the nuclear terrorism scenarios in the public 
debate have been substantially exaggerated 
and overblown in the post-2001 era. 
Hyped Threats
Predictably, the buzzword of nuclear terrorism 
transforms into an imaginative and hyped 
proposition. Sifting realistic and probable 
threats on the question of nuclear terrorism 
challenges from overestimated and improba-
ble assertions allows sober assessment of prob-
able scenarios, reduces complacency, and 
encourages constructive and forward thinking 
in the international community. 
The most realistic threat is determined by 
an evaluation based on technical and security 
rationales. We use Ferguson and Potter’s four 
“faces” of nuclear terrorism to survey the 
threats: (1) theft of an intact nuclear weapon; 
(2) theft of fissile material leading to the devel-
opment of an improvised nuclear device 
(IND); (3) acquisition of radioactive material 
to fashion a radiation dispersion device (RDD) 
or radiation emission device (RED); and (4) 
an attack on a nuclear facility that releases 
radioactive materials.17
We assess that the first two of Ferguson 
and Potter’s scenarios are of high consequence, 
but the least probable. One of the most perva-
sive hyped assertions is that the radical reli-
gious groups or TTP in Pakistan could usurp 
state power and gain access to Pakistan’s 
nuclear arsenal. Instead of basing the risk on a 
measured assessment, these fears are based on 
multiplying two trends; the rise of religious 
extremism and TTP in tribal areas, and the 
growth of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The com-
bination conjures up images of exponentially 
increased likelihood and consequence. The 
surge of religious groups, intolerance towards 
minorities, and TTP are an outgrowth of three 
decades of religiously based guerilla wars 
waged in the tribal lands of Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The core of violent radical threats 
The expansion and strengthening of 
international nuclear safeguards along with 
an increased commitment and buy-in from 
the state to tackle terrorism are the pathways 
towards reducing the conditions for terrorism.
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resides in these borderlands, and military 
operations continue there at the time of this 
writing. Pakistanis have borne the brunt of ter-
ror attacks across the entire country and have 
repeatedly rejected radical religious parties in 
its two democratic political transitions. While 
it is true that Pakistan faces unprecedented 
threats from radical forces the probability of a 
takeover of the state is hyperbole and near 
zero. Similarly, the drivers of growth of nuclear 
weapons are related to the strategic competi-
tion with India and its deterrence require-
ments, and have no correlation to the threat in 
the tribal areas. Nevertheless, it is important 
that this internal threat is recognized and not 
ignored by the state. 
Another exaggerated threat is based on the 
fear that Islamic militants in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) will gain 
access to nuclear materials and either auction 
them on the black market or develop an IND. 
This fear is based on previous examples of 
militants utilizing ransom, kidnappings, and 
drug sales to gain revenue. In an era of 
increased localized autonomy of al-Qaeda off-
shoots, there is an increased need for local self-
financing.18 The potential for enormous payoff 
makes selling stolen fissile material a logical 
venture. However, it is impractical to acquire, 
transport, safely store, and transfer nuclear 
weapons materials because this highly sensi-
tive process would be fraught with safety and 
security dangers that terrorist groups with lim-
ited resources would be unable to surmount.19 
To date there is no evidence such a theft has 
occurred in South Asia. States consider nuclear 
weapons as their national crown jewels and 
guard them with utmost secrecy and protec-
tion. Significant dangers are associated with 
the acquisition and transportation of such 
materials and both accounting and protection 
are receiving greater attention.20 While this 
threat is exaggerated, the development of a 
dirty bomb with radioactive materials and 
conventional explosives cannot be ruled out. 
How probable is it then that such a threat 
would materialize? Even if the most unlikely 
scenario occurs, what are the consequences 
and what are the most realistic risks to evalu-
ate? In order to effectively meet the challenges 
of South Asian nuclear terrorism, the most 
realistic threats in the region must be separated 
from the hyperbolic threats.
Most Realistic Threat
The third and the fourth scenarios fall into the 
higher probability categories, with a spectrum 
of possible consequences.21 An RED or RDD 
attack will have immediate economic and psy-
chological consequences and might constitute 
the classic definition of terrorism. Similarly, an 
attack on a nuclear facility, whether or not it 
succeeds, would create a psychological specter 
of terrorizing the state, as could holding the 
nuclear facility or material hostage. The psy-
chological impact of a penetration of a nuclear 
installation will instantly create an interna-
tional panic based on the possibility of 
insider-outsider collusion.
First, it is technically less difficult to make 
an RED or RDD than an IND. In our assess-
ment, an attempt to make an IND by a terror-
ist group is more likely to result in an RDD 
due to the scientific design challenges, which 
are not as simple as some scholars believe. If 
While it is true that Pakistan faces 
unprecedented threats from radical forces 
the probability of a takeover of the state is 
hyperbole and near zero.
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an RED or RDD were achieved in a terror 
attack originally designed to detonate as an 
IND, it would still have significant radiological 
dispersal consequences. In South Asia, an RED 
or RDD can be used to replace the conven-
tional terror response such as a car bomb or 
suicide attack. Over a period of time, Indian 
and Pakistani security forces have developed 
counterterror tactics to expose and prevent 
conventional terrorist attacks; therefore, an 
RDD is an adaptive replacement. Especially in 
Pakistan, terrorists have claimed to have car-
ried out attacks on soft targets in cities and 
military garrisons in retaliation for ongoing 
operations or drone strikes conducted by the 
United States. Should a conventional terror 
attack fail because of countervailing strategies 
by security forces, an RED or RDD could be the 
new tool. 
In South Asia, we assess an armed attack 
on a nuclear installation as the threat with the 
highest combination of probability and con-
sequence. Unlike the other scenarios, there has 
been evidence of terrorists employing this 
strategy with some success. In this situation, 
the probability is high due to the evidence of 
similar style attacks in both India and 
Pakistan. A commando-type siege would not 
show signatures that would exist in the theft or 
movement of a nuclear weapon or nuclear 
material. Both India and Pakistan have experi-
enced several attacks on military facilities, 
government sites, and symbolic soft targets. In 
Pakistan, examples include the 2012 attack on 
the Minhas Air Force Base in Kamra, the May 
2011 TTP raid on Pakistan Naval Station (PNS) 
Mehran in Karachi, and the 2009 TTP attack 
and hostage crisis at the Pakistan Army 
General Headquarters.22 Examples of attacks 
on military and government facilities in India 
include the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2002 
attack on an Indian army base in Kaluchak, 
and the 2008 synchronized attacks and hos-
tage siege in Mumbai.23 Such attacks may not 
have succeeded in their respective missions, 
and each resulted in only modest destruction. 
However, though far short of “success,” the 
hype and fear created by such events evokes a 
serious psychological impact that allows ter-
rorists to achieve other objectives. 
We believe that such an attack would 
result in a moderate consequence level – less 
devastating than the detonation of a nuclear 
bomb on a population, but more damaging 
than a radiological attack. Since the probabil-
ity of the first through third scenarios is close 
to zero, the probability of this attack is a more 
important factor than the level of destruction 
that would result. It is important to note that 
our threat assessment does not anticipate a 
situation where the terrorists accessed radioac-
tive materials at the facility. We assess the 
probability of an attack on the nuclear facility 
resulting in the release of substantial radiation 
as small. Ultimately, the actual attack on the 
facility is the most probable situation; the high 
consequence interaction with radioactive 
materials would only confirm and compound 
the already evident consequence.24
On the other hand, Rajesh Basrur and 
Friedrich Steinhäusler evaluated such attacks 
in India and identified security risks for Indian 
nuclear power plants. They offer scenarios 
Though far short of “success,” the hype and 
fear created by such events evokes a serious 
psychological impact that allows terrorists to 
achieve other objectives. 
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including attackers gaining access to a base 
and detonating a bomb that releases radioac-
tivity, suicide truck attacks on facility entry 
points, and a suicide attack on the nuclear 
facility’s spent fuel storage pool by a civilian 
aircraft.25 Due to India’s three-pronged 
approach for its civilian nuclear infrastructure, 
the different types of reactors have different 
strengths and vulnerabilities.26
The most probable threat in South Asia is 
an attack on nuclear infrastructure as its expan-
sion provides more targets for terrorists. The 
growing number of facilities also increases the 
potential of vulnerabilities from insider 
threats. Despite the rigor of personnel reliabil-
ity screening programs, there inevitably 
remains a potential for violent attacks from 
insiders. This has previously occurred in India, 
for example when Indira Gandhi was killed by 
her own bodyguards.27 Similarly, Pakistan 
Governor Salman Taseer was assassinated by 
his  own bodyguard in January 2011. 28 
Personnel reliability programs are very impor-
tant in South Asian states and provide oppor-
tunities for assurance and cooperation in both 
countries, but as these examples show they are 
far from perfect. 
Site security is intrinsically linked to site 
selection. In South Asia, site selection must 
balance the external and internal threat matrix 
with the proximity of resources and response 
capacity. All these factors must be considered 
from the safety and security standpoints. First, 
major research centers must be in close prox-
imity to technological hubs and the availabil-
ity of top scientists and technicians as well as 
access to reinforcement from military garri-
sons. Second, power plants have different 
requirements for water and cooling resources. 
Plants must be located at a sufficient depth 
from borders to provide adequate warning of 
external attack – especially from the air – but 
cannot be too close to volatile borderlands 
and hostile areas. Third, storage sites selection 
may have different criteria to limit vulnerabil-
ities without compromising security. These 
criteria include limited access, camouflage 
requirements and proximity to deployment 
areas. Compared to India’s vast territory, 
Pakistan’s geography and terrain do not allow 
the luxury of a wide choice of locations. 
However, the nature of the terrain and the 
proximity of garrisons and water sources pro-
vide well-controlled venues where site protec-
tion and security parameters can be developed 
into a robust system. And given Pakistani 
threat perceptions and the role of nuclear 
weapons as the source of ultimate national 
achievement as well as a tool for survival, it is 
not imaginable that these crown jewels would 
be managed in a lackluster manner.29 On site 
security, India has the luxury of space and 
fewer internally disturbed areas which afford 
it more flexibility. Pakistan is limited by space 
restrictions and pervasive domestic instability 
that increases the pressure as arsenals grow. 
An attack on a South Asian nuclear facility 
has not occurred for several reasons. First, 
existing outward security deters terrorists from 
waging an assault. It is likely that the trend 
toward a growing number of nuclear facilities, 
and as other targets previously deemed imper-
vious to attack are compromised, terrorists will 
We recommend that both India and Pakistan 
respond directly to terrorism, nuclear security, 
and nuclear safety through a combination of 
the existing international and multilateral 
regimes, as well as implementing national 
legislation to establish future bilateral steps.
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be emboldened to attack even seemingly well-
guarded nuclear facilities in the future. A 
highly guarded facility would be logistically 
difficult to attack due to multiple rings of secu-
rity. However, terrorist organizations have 
proven adaptable and capable of circumvent-
ing even the best guarded infrastructure. 
Another possible explanation is that the loca-
tions of many nuclear storage sites are highly 
classified and unknown to terrorists. It would 
be reasonable for terrorist groups, having done 
a cost-benefit analysis, to conclude that con-
ventional weapons are sufficient to create a 
high-consequence terror attack. 
South Asian nuclear facilities are not 
uniquely vulnerable to terrorist attack. There 
have been multiple attacks on South Africa’s 
Pelindaba nuclear facility which is believed to 
contain the national stocks of highly enriched 
uranium (HEU). Although the attacks appear 
to have been crimes of opportunism, they have 
exposed the deficiencies in protective measures 
that could be devastating when combined with 
terrorist motivation.30 Other examples include 
the 1972 and 1977 attacks on nuclear facilities 
in West Germany by the Baader-Meinhof Gang 
(Red Army Faction). The group bombed U.S. 
military facilities and attempted to seize tacti-
cal nuclear weapons. In response to this attack, 
the U.S. military implemented site consolida-
tion measures and heightened security.31
Given the prospects of realistic terror 
threats in South Asia and examples in other 
areas of the world, we recommend that both 
India and Pakistan respond directly to terror-
ism, nuclear security, and nuclear safety 
through a combination of the existing interna-
tional and multilateral regimes, as well as 
implementing national legislation to establish 
future bilateral steps.
Regional Response
South Asia has a long history of developing 
innovative Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs).32 Yet so far, there has been no sub-
stantive progress on conflict resolution or the 
structuring of an arms control regime that 
encompasses conventional force balances, 
nuclear restraint measures, and other forms of 
risk reduction. Worse, the menace of terrorism 
that has increasingly bedeviled the region for 
multiple decades has been met with an inap-
propriate and inadequate response by both 
India and Pakistan; terrorism should be ele-
vated as the highest priority to South Asian 
security and must be effectively addressed. This 
article has portrayed terrorism as a stand-alone 
issue and nuclear terrorism as a component of 
the broader terrorism challenge in the region. 
We recommend that India and Pakistan deal 
with regional terrorism above all other cross-
border or other disputes. All nuclear arms con-
trol negotiations and CBMs must include dis-
cussions of terrorism, as well as of nuclear 
safety and security, cooperation, and bilateral 
consensus. 
In order to identify future steps, we exam-
ine below the existing multilateral initiatives 
that contain binding obligations. By identify-
ing the highest risk, both countries can re-pur-
pose and expand the established mechanisms 
India’s and Pakistan’s international 
obligations require both states to take 
legislative measures, physical responses, and 
international cooperation on issues in nuclear 
safety, security, and terrorism.
TACKLING NUCLEAR TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA
PRISM 5, no. 1 FEATURES  | 95
to deal directly with the nuclear security envi-
ronment in the region.
Existing International Tools and Obligations 
As a first step, India’s and Pakistan’s interna-
tional obligations require both states to take 
legislative measures, physical responses, and 
international cooperation on issues in nuclear 
safety, security, and terrorism. This creates the 
foundation for both states to build on their 
existing individual responses and to cooperate 
bilaterally and regionally on these topics. 
Regional responses are necessary because ter-
rorism and the implications of nuclear expan-
sion do not recognize political boundaries. 
Taking into account the highest risk 
nuclear terrorism attack and the threat from 
terrorism itself, there are many tools to equip 
the international community to prevent and 
mitigate nuclear terrorism. However, most of 
the existing international initiatives and 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
(UNSCR) regulate proliferation and the trans-
fer of materials. A first proposal is to create a 
regional regime derived from the UNSCR 1540 
(discussed below). A second recommendation 
is to develop a regime focusing on terrorism 
utilizing the existing structure created in the 
1999, 2004, and 2007 bilateral regional agree-
ments that will each be explained in detail 
below. In combination, we propose the 
recently incoming Indian and Pakistani gov-
ernments develop a regional security response 
to a potential nuclear incident or nuclear terror 
attack.
UNSCR 1540 mandated the development 
and enforcement of legal and regulatory mech-
anisms for proliferation of nuclear materials 
and criminalization of non-state actor involve-
ment with nuclear weapons.33 Although this 
resolution mainly addresses proliferation, it is 
derived from a series of UNSC resolutions 
regulating international terrorism. As part of 
this regime, UNSCR 1540 aims to incorporate 
counter-terrorism into the nuclear and prolif-
eration legislation and set forth standards for 
implementation under Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter.34 Therefore, non-state 
actor involvement with anything related to 
nuclear weapon safety and security is a crimi-
nal act recognized as such by both states 
because the domestic legislation in both India 
and Pakistan has been brought into line.35 A 
criminal activity or accidental activity in either 
territory or in a geographically proximate 
region obliges both countries to develop a 
response and cooperate with international 
efforts. We propose that the domestic and 
international components should be trans-
formed into a regional obligation in the case 
of a threat to a nuclear installation. As part of 
a future regional cooperative agreement, both 
India and Pakistan must act in a transparent 
manner and cooperate with international mea-
sures.
To weave together a regional regime on 
nuclear terrorism, existing regional agreements 
are already available to India and Pakistan. The 
foremost document is the 1999 Lahore 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
which was coincidently signed by the two par-
ties now in power – the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) in India and the Pakistan Muslim League 
(Nawaz). Part III of the Lahore MOU commits 
both states to reducing the risk of accidental or 
We propose the recently incoming Indian and 
Pakistani governments develop a regional 
security response to a potential nuclear 
incident or nuclear terror attack.
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unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and to 
notify the other of the risk of any decision or 
actions that would result in adverse conse-
quences. Although at the time this was 
restricted to unauthorized use of weapons or a 
nuclear accident, this could now be expanded 
to incorporate the UNSCR 1540 requirements 
on terrorism. Second, during the 2004 joint 
India-Pakistan statement following the Twelfth 
SAARC Summit, both countries pledged to 
prevent terrorism in the region and are bound 
to not support terrorism in any manner.36 In 
addition, the Islamabad Declaration reaf-
firmed the commitment to a SAARC Regional 
Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 
and included the signing of an Additional 
Protocol on terrorist financing.37 The third 
instrument was the 2007 CBM between India 
and Pakistan for the “Agreement on Reducing 
the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear 
Weapons.” This agreement pledged each to 
notify the other in the case of an accident 
involving nuclear weapons.38 This agreement 
was originally established for five years and 
reaffirmed in 2012 for a five-year extension.39
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
During the Cold War, the United States and 
the Soviet Union agreed to multiple CBMs to 
prevent situations in which non-state actors 
gained control of any part of their respective 
nuclear arsenals. These CBMs existed in an 
environment with limited internal terrorist 
threats and extensive nuclear security and 
safety systems to keep the arsenals secure. As 
discussed above, India and Pakistan have 
numerous reasons to create a regional nuclear 
security architecture. Yet there have been no 
major steps, dialogues, or even the exchange 
of CBMs and nuclear risk reduction measure 
ideas since the 2007 bilateral broad based 
agreement. The shroud of secrecy surrounding 
nuclear weapons in South Asia must be 
removed to establish necessary CBMs on 
nuclear security, nuclear safety, and nuclear ter-
rorism.
Based on UNSCR 1540 and the existing 
bilateral agreements, we offer a list of policy 
recommendations to combat the most realistic 
threat from nuclear terrorism in South Asia:
■■ Committed military and political leader-
ship: Combatting all strains of terrorism 
requires considerable political will and ded-
icated leadership from both the political 
apparatus and the military. While lower lev-
els of bureaucratic engagement can contrib-
ute to progress, routine senior meetings 
dedicated exclusively to terrorism issues are 
necessary to generate results. Although the 
Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers meet 
on the sidelines of international meetings, 
there is a need for periodic regional bilateral 
meetings between the Prime Ministers, 
Directors General of Military Operations 
(DGMO), and heads of intelligence agen-
cies. 
■■ Regional bilateral engagement: We rec-
ommend direct regional bilateral contact 
between the chairmen of the Pakistani 
Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) and the 
Indian Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC), 
as well as between the Pakistani Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority (PNRA) and the Indian 
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (INRA). 
There have been no major steps, dialogues, 
or even the exchange of CBMs and nuclear 
risk reduction measure ideas since the 2007 
bilateral broad based agreement. 
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■■ National risk reduction centers: Since a 
host of confidence building measures and 
nuclear risk reduction measures have failed 
to create durable peace, nuclear risk reduc-
tion centers (NRRCs) should be established. 
NRRCs can build on the existing CBM and 
NRRM framework to serve as coordination 
centers to facilitate communication, identify 
triggers for escalation, and negotiate conflict 
resolution. NRRCs are intended to bolster 
official lines of diplomatic or military com-
munication in the event of a nuclear emer-
gency, not replace established communica-
tion.40
■■ Exchange of radiation data: We recom-
mend sharing radiation data around nuclear 
power plants of each country and the 
exchange of documents that identify steps 
for protective measures against accidents 
taken by each country.
■■ Civil society summits: In order to incor-
porate valuable subject matter expertise 
from regional think tanks and universities, 
the major think tanks in India and Pakistan 
should hold joint seminars to directly 
address regional nuclear questions and 
issues. 
■■ Indefinite extension of nuclear agree-
ments: The Agreement on Reducing the Risk 
from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons 
was initially signed in 2007 and extended for 
an additional five years in 2012. This agree-
ment should be extended indefinitely and 
include an additional protocol agreement to 
deal with consequence management of a ter-
rorist incident at a nuclear installation and 
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